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Available online xxxxCondominium neighbourhoods are emerging in intensifying city centres as a response to market and demo-
graphic preferences for homeownership.While themulti-ownership structure of individual condominiumbuild-
ings accommodates a short-term demand, the long-term implications for neighbourhoods is a source of concern.
In particular, the presence of unit ownerswith varied acquisition objectives can lead to an anticommons problem
resulting in building disinvestment due to an inability to reach decisions on sustainable maintenance fees and
capital reserve funds, and a lack of end of lifecycle planning. The City of Toronto is experiencing unprecedented
condominium development and serves as the basis for a case study that assesses the anticipated future
neighbourhood challenges associated with a predominantly condominium-based form of ownership. Twenty-
two local stakeholders were interviewed to identify problems that are viewed as sources of concern due to deci-
sionsmade during the early stages of a building's lifecycle and the absence of a neighbourhood planning strategy.
An analysis of the results indicates that lock-in, lacunae and neighbourhood effects will likely complicate
revitalisation efforts as condominium neighbourhoods become more prevalent. Limited stakeholder recognition
further suggests that it is necessary to raise a greater awareness of the potential anticommons impediments to
long-term collective revitalisation actions.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Keywords:
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Toronto1. Introduction
"So here is a building that over the years has just turned into a stu-
dent ghetto with lots of investors. The condo board is dominated
by investors so when they put their hand up to ﬁx the pool no one
wants to do it. So ﬁnally the city [of Toronto] issued orders to get
some of the stuff done. Their parking lot was uninhabitable, so they
closed it. It caused a huge problemwith some of the end users and it
doesn't really matter but the long and short of the story is that a re-
ceivermoved in tomanage the condo corporation…. The problem is
that in this complex you have over 1,000 units, it's huge, and it is
long and broad and eight storeys high. Then you have the widest
range of owners you could imagine, we got to tour some of these
units. From the outside it looks like a ghetto but you go through
some of these units and some of them are absolutely stunning. Peo-
ple have put their life's work into it and then you go through another
one and it is a complete ghetto. So you have these people who say
‘no I'm not moving’ and ‘I am not selling’. In this case it is like 25%ebber@ryerson.ca (S. Webber).
. This is an open access article underof the people, so now you have a stalemate. Where it goes I don't
know, I really don't know." (Interviewee, Planner B)
Private property-led revitalisation has been a key component of
urban redevelopment strategies in a wide range of global cities over
the past twenty years (Butler, 2007; Pow, 2011). This trend is
characterised by a shift in residential construction fromouter periphery,
suburban and rural housing towards the centre of cities, particularly in
North America (Ford, 1994; Nelson, 2009; Lehrer, Keil, & Kipfer, 2010;
Scott, 2011). Due in part to land supply and demand factors, housing af-
fordability in many global urban areas has declined sharply during this
period - particularly for detached or freehold homes (Davidson & Lees,
2005; Addison, Zhang, & Coomes, 2013). Yet the desire for home own-
ership and its perceived investment beneﬁts remains a strong source
of demand inmany of these locations. As a result, condominium owner-
ship - also known as strata title in many jurisdictions - has been utilised
to provide ownership options that also stimulate residential investment
in urban areas (Harris, 2011).
While often referred to as a style of building, condominium is broad-
ly deﬁned in a legal context as the fee simple ownership of an individual
dwelling in a multi-unit structure that includes joint-ownership of an
undivided interest in the associated land and facilities held in common.
High-rise condominium developments that have come to dominatethe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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this research.
Condominiums were introduced to North America in the 1960s,
however the implications of multi-owned developments on urban
neighbourhood demographics and the quality of the built environment
remains unclear (Dredge & Coiacetto, 2011). Rosen and Walks (2013,
p. 161) argue that ‘condo-ism’ represents a new approach “in which de-
velopment agendas, ﬁnancial structures, urban policies, and lifestyles all
converge and are dependent on the continued spatial restructuring of
the city through urban intensiﬁcation”. This convergence of processes
and urban intensiﬁcation has potential long-term ramiﬁcations for cities
as ‘condominium neighbourhoods' emerge in areas where property re-
volves not around individually owned parcels of land or corporately
owned apartment buildings, but rather multiple unit owners
subdivided vertically, all living within a shared building that deﬁnes
their immediate community.
In Canada, the rise in urban condominium construction is largely as-
sociated with demand from three submarkets; older ‘empty nesters’
downsizing to smaller, lower maintenance housing; younger adults
and newly formed households seeking to get on the property ladder;
and millennials attracted by the availability of urban amenities and ac-
cess to centralised employment opportunities (Hulchanski, 1988;
Skaburskis, 1988; Rosen &Walks, 2013). In Canada's largest city, Toron-
to, condominiums have become a ubiquitous feature, with 130 high-rise
buildings having been under construction in 2014 alone, 92% of which
were residential (Emporis, 2014). Condominium ownership in the City
of Toronto rose from just 6% in 1981 to 23% in 2011 (Statistics Canada,
2011). From 2006 to 2015 there have been approximately 300,000 con-
dominium units built in a city of 2.6 million people. The unprecedented
rate and intensity of downtown Toronto condominiumgrowth is of par-
ticular interest because of the challenges associatedwith this type of de-
velopment on anticipated neighbourhood regeneration efforts.
In their early incarnations condominium neighbourhoods typically
act as catalysts for gentriﬁcation and renewal by appealing to the life-
style preferences of middle-class homeowners (Brueckner &
Rosenthal, 2005; Skaburskis, 2010; Davidson & Lees, 2005). YetMap 1. Number of units per development by condominium development (January 2006 to Ju
(2015). Map contains ward boundary information licensed under the Open Government Licenquestions remain about the long-term stability of these neighbourhoods
and the adaptability of this ownership structure to future challenges, es-
pecially when consideration is given to building lifecycle issues
(Easthope et al., 2014). The novelty and lack of maturity of condomini-
um neighbourhoods as a distinct type of development is a point that
Harris (2011, 721) emphasises in his concluding discussion on the im-
pact of condominiums in Vancouver, noting:
“…perhaps it is the newness of the legal form and the fact that the
buildings constructed around it are also new, or newly renovated,
that has led many to associate condominium with gentriﬁcation.
As the buildings age, the luster of many will fade, and the extent of
renovation or rebuilding rather than the form of ownership will de-
ﬁne the character of neighborhoods”.
Just as condominiums are seen as a way to regenerate urban cores,
provide differentiated housing options, and attract the middle-classes,
the landscape of these neighbourhoods may themselves be in need of
substantial renewal leading to a range of social, economic, and built en-
vironment concerns.
Dredge and Coiacetto (2011) argue there is a need for studies that
examine condominiums at the neighbourhood scale and assess their
wider socio-economic implications. The following research addresses
this gap by taking the neighbourhood as the key scale fromwhich to ex-
plore the interaction between condominium ownership, property de-
velopment, and public planning objectives. It opens by discussing the
rise and eventual revitalisation of condominium neighbourhoods from
an international perspective, drawing out key drivers and the reasons
why these aging locales eventually required collective urban
revitalisation responses. It then goes on to conceptualise the dynamics
within these condominium neighbourhoods as a tragedy of the
anticommons problem, proposing that as they progress through their
lifecycle a range of effects exponentially increase, potentially complicat-
ing solutions to the anticommons problem and urban revitalisation.
Next, condominium development in the City of Toronto, Canada serves
as the basis for a case study examining the future implications of thisly 2015, including under construction and proposed) in Toronto. Source: urbanToronto
ce - Toronto.
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empirically tested by drawing on 22 in-depth interviews lasting
approximately an hour each with government ofﬁcials, ﬁnancial ex-
perts, developers, planning and built environment policymakers and
practitioners to explore condominium neighbourhoods at the early
stages of their lifecycle, identifying key long-term concerns and
assessing awareness of potential future issues. The paper concludes by
pressing for raised awareness of the long-term ramiﬁcations of
condominium neighbourhood development as a distinct urban policy
concern.
2. Condominium neighbourhood revitalisation
Jurisdictions around the world are beginning to struggle with the
need to revitalise mature condominium neighbourhoods. As Harris
and Gilewicz (2015, p. 265) have observed:
Most of the common-law world introduced condominium legisla-
tion in the 1960s, and title holders within condominium buildings, par-
ticularly those constructed in the early decades of the statutory
schemes, increasingly confront signiﬁcant renovation expenses. More-
over, escalating land prices and, in some cases, changes to municipal
zoning or development regimes create pressure to redevelop land.
In Hong Kong the emergence of large-scale private developers in the
1980s led to a push for the comprehensive redevelopment of multi-
owner residential high-rise neighbourhoods that were in poor condi-
tion but located in prime real estate locations. Many of these redevelop-
ment initiatives encountered difﬁculties with land assembly because
individual units needed to be acquired prior to development taking
place. These efforts were further complicated by an abundance ofMap 2. Number of units per development by condominium development (January 2006 to
urbanToronto (2015). Map contains Stamen Design with data from OpenStreetMaps.absentee owners and undocumented inheritance of properties leading
to land assembly issues (Gar-On Yeh, 1990; Ng, 2002; Yau & Chan,
2008). To solve this problem, government backed ‘Land Development
Corporations’ were ultimately created to consolidate land for private
purposes if after twelve months owners and tenants declined a ‘reason-
able’ offer. The high-rise nature of most multi-owned complexes in
Hong Kong has resulted in continued urban revitalisation efforts due
to recognition of not only the visual deterioration that eventually
emerges as these structures age, but also the ever present health and
safety issues that high-rise developments pose to residents and those
surrounding the buildings (Yau & Chan, 2008; Ho, Yau, Poon, &
Liusman, 2012). Similar high-rise deterioration has occurred in South
Korea, requiring a reactive policy response in order to better facilitate
urban revitalisation (Kim, Brand, Lee, & Park, 2013).
In Singapore, site amalgamation attempts in areas of high develop-
ment potential encountered a similar lack of consensus amongst prop-
erty owners in multi-storey neighbourhoods. Rather than legally
enforce land assembly when consensus failed, the government altered
the legislation governing condominium buildings to allow the sale of a
building that is more than 10 years old with the agreement of 80% of
units rather than the 100% that was previously required (Sim, Lum, &
Malone-Lee, 2002). Sim et al. (2002) argue that this change has been
largely successful in encouraging redevelopment however it raises con-
cerns about property rights infringement for a minority of unit owners
(Christudason, 2009; Troy, Easthope, Randolph, & Pinnegar, 2016).
New South Wales in Australia is currently following Singapore's lead
by initiating changes in legislation to allow full building sale based on
a 75% owner majority decision (NSW Government, 2016). Legislation
is being driven by two main factors; decades old buildings becomingJuly 2015, including under construction and proposed) in Downtown Toronto. Source:
Fig. 1. Basic anticommons condominium neighbourhood problem.
51B. Webb, S. Webber / Cities 61 (2017) 48–57rundown and in need of comprehensive revitalisation, and the under-
utilisation of high value land where buildings were developed at what
are now considered to be low densities (Easthope, Hudson, &
Randolph, 2013).
North of New South Wales, Queensland's Gold Coast is also strug-
gling with the management of condominium neighbourhoods due to
its focus as a major tourist destination. Age is a particular concern in
this case, as over 50% of the condominiums on the Gold Coast are now
over 30 years old, leading Warnken et al. (2003; 160) to argue that “if
rejuvenation efforts are not successfully undertaken in the future, the
image of the Gold Coast will increasingly become that of an outdated,
deteriorating and unattractive destination”. In this case it is the larger
condominium neighbourhood and the areas attractiveness as a destina-
tion by short-term renters, rather than the underutilisation of land, that
is the chief cause for concern. Individuals who bought units as invest-
ments are struggling amongst themselves and with owner-occupiers
to agree on the appropriate amount of maintenance and associated
costs. Other condominium neighbourhoods have not yet reachedmatu-
rity but are also experiencing friction between owners, investors, and
government condominium policies as strengthening rental markets
drive condominium conversions. For example, property companies in
Chicago are increasingly looking to purchase the totality of condomini-
um units in a building in order to convert them to rental apartment
units (Gallun, 2015).
Two key drivers of condominium neighbourhood revitalisation can
be drawn out from the preceding discussion. First, the long maturation
process often means that gentriﬁcation activity could be negated by fu-
ture concerns emerging over poor building maintenance. This is espe-
cially acute when neighbouring condominiums of a similar age
simultaneously reach obsolescence. Secondly, under-utilisation of land
is often a key economic driver for the revitalisation of condominium
neighbourhoods based on shifts deﬁning new highest and best uses
for these locations. Linked to this, market drivers also involve changes
in preferences for the type of housing as rental and ownership demand
ebbs and ﬂows over the decades (Steele, 1993; Hirayama, 2005). This
leads to questions about the ability of condominium neighbourhoods
to appropriately adjust to change given their built form and the complex
legal ownership framework (Johnston & Reid, 2013; Harris & Gilewicz,
2015), giving rise to a tragedy of the anticommons problem and the
need to more speciﬁcally problematize the lifecycle of condominium
neighbourhoods.
3. Condominiums as a tragedy of the anticommons problem
The tragedy of the commons, the term coined by Garrett Hardin
(1968) explains how perceived reasonable individual actions, such as
ﬁshing, can collectively lead to overuse of a scare resource. In this way
the commons are deﬁned by free access and a lack of exclusionary rights
(Michelman, 1982). Typically three approaches are called upon toman-
age the commons problem: privatisation, through the splitting of the
commons into private property to encourage individual management
and rationing of the resource; regulation, through the introduction
and enforcement of rules over the use of the commons to compel ration-
ing; or cooperation, through non-enforced consensus management of
the resource for mutual beneﬁt (Heller, 2013).
Legislation governing condominiums typically ensures the tragedy
of the commons is largely avoided through a nomocratic planning ap-
proach (Moroni, 2015; Slaev, 2016), ﬁrst through the distribution of
the majority of the structure amongst multiple private owners thereby
reducing the amount of common access and use within the overall
structure, second through legal mechanisms to enforce rules on com-
mon areas and ﬁnance, and third through the establishment of a condo-
minium board for management purposes and as a forum for collective
decision-making. Yet while each of these may be seen as a solution,
they must also confront the potential tragedy of the anticommons.
The tragedy of the anticommons is typically deﬁned not by overusebut rather underuse of a resource (in this case the entirety of the condo-
minium building or the land it sits on) as individual owners exercise a
right of exclusion in relation to the use or sale of commonly owned ele-
ments over other titleholders, thereby preventing the dissolution of the
condominium. As Harris and Gilewicz (2015, p. 265) explain:
Perhaps the single most important decision in the lifecycle of a con-
dominium is the one to dissolve it… Title holders pursue dissolution to
maximize the exchange value of the assets formerly within the legal
form. Most commonly, this is the result of the gains to be had from re-
developing land, the need for extensive renovation of the common
property, or some combination of the two.
Within condominiums the common elements are jointly owned and
therefore owners must collectively agree to sell the entire building,
however some owners may not wish to and as a result prevent others
from doing so. When multiple owners have the right to exclude others
from the use of a scare resource and no individual owner is privileged
with the exclusive right of use then a tragedy of the anticommons can
occur (Heller, 1998). Collective decision-making and coordination is
therefore required to ensure all owners agree to the use of the resource.
More widely, “though the anticommons concept refers at its core to
fragmented ownership, the idea extends to fragmented decision-
making more generally” (Heller, 2013, p. 12). Broadly jurisdictions
have sought to address this issue by legislatingdissolution of condomin-
ium corporations in two ways (Harris & Gilewicz, 2015). The ﬁrst, and
least utilised, is the unanimity rule where unanimous consent of all
owners is required in order for the condominium corporation to be dis-
solved. The second is more widely used and requires a supermajority,
usually 75–80% of owners to agree to the sale thereby preventing a
fewowners from preventing the sale of the entire structure. In the Prov-
ince of Ontario, where Toronto is located, the threshold is set at 80%. In
both cases it is possible for court intervention to also be employed to
force dissolution if certain conditions are met.
The use of the anticommons as a conceptual framework has been of
particular value to a number of authors interested in the dynamics of
the real estate market, often framing problems as land assembly issues
resulting in higher transaction costs (Fennell, 2009). The concept has
also been used in a limited fashion to discuss the dynamics of condo-
minium ownership, driven by the idea that “property becomes
entrenched as an anticommons: rights of exclusion become distributed
among somany owners that it becomes too difﬁcult to agree to develop
the property at a higher use” (West & Morris, 2003, p. 904). While the
neoclassical optimal redevelopment rule assumes that rational owners
will agree to sell their property when the price of land for a higher
and better use exceeds the price for the current use, this often does
not occur due to differences in owner behaviour (Rosenthal & Helsley,
1994; Adams, Disberry, Hutchison, & Munjoma, 2001; Harris &
Gilewicz, 2015). Strategic holdout behaviour becomes common in
these situations, as there are no perfect substitutes, projection of future
value is difﬁcult, and the general lifespan of buildings is long, making
miscalculations in behaviour more common and costly (Schulz, Parisi,
& Depoorter, 2002). The tragedy of the anticommons complicates this
process in condominiums when a majority of owners may wish to sell
their titles but a dissenting minority with exclusionary rights may not
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super-majority may be required to transfer ownership of an entire
condominium building (Harris & Gilewicz, 2015).
In recent decades this has been manifested in the refusal of certain
condominium unit owners to sell their property when it reaches obso-
lescence (Easthope et al., 2013), neighbourhood revitalisation is pro-
posed (Warnken et al., 2003; Gar-On Yeh, 1990; Lum, Sim, &
Malone-Lee, 2004) or when natural disasters cause costly structural
damage (West &Morris, 2003). The reasons behind the utilisation of ex-
clusionary rights by an owner may vary (Sim et al., 2002, p. 460):
In the anticommons regime, exclusion rightsmay be assigned toper-
sonswho cannot, ormay not desire to, capture directly pecuniary gains.
Conﬂicts may arise among excluders whomay have different objectives
for facility development. Moreover, there may be owners who are not
interested in compensations.
From a condominium neighbourhood revitalisation perspective, the
tragedy of the anticommons can be characterised as a ‘vertical property
assembly problem’. Past discussions of urban redevelopment land as-
sembly have been largely focused on surmounting a limited number
of individual ownership constraints to assemble land for neighbourhood
revitalisation schemes (see Adams et al., 2001 for a discussion on the
general nature of ownership constraints). However, condominium
neighbourhoods require the reconciliation of multiple property owner-
ship constraints in a single building in order to obtain a singular parcel
of land which is coupled with the additional burden of resolving those
same constraints in numerous other surrounding condominium build-
ings that make up the wider neighbourhood.
As condominium neighbourhoods age the tragedy of the
anticommons potentially becomes more complex to resolve and more
prevalent over time until it reaches a breaking point, when age, land
values, or other revitalization drivers results in the need to collectively
sell all the units in a condominium or redevelop, at which point key
stakeholders must either cooperatively resolve the problem or have a
solution imposed on them. The following draws on Toronto, Canada to
explore the basis for this assertion by elaborating on the origins of
the noted effects, and reﬂecting on the future of condominium
neighbourhoods by examining the potential roles of the key
stakeholders as structures age.
4. Condominiums in Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Condominium ownership structure is relatively new to Ontario,
Canada's most populous province. The ﬁrst Condominium Actwas intro-
duced by the province of Ontario in 1968 as a response to changing de-
mographics and a need to regulate a ﬂedgling industry (Hulchanski,
1988; McLaughlin, 1982). To date only a handful of condominium cor-
porations have been dissolved in the province, the most recent being
in 2014 (Ontario Supreme Court of Justice, 2014). However with an es-
timated 10,000 condominium corporations having been created since
the Condominium Act was ﬁrst introduced there is potential for such
dissolutions to become more common. Despite a 1998 update, the in-
ability of the ill-equipped legislation to respond to themost recent con-
dominium boom led to a provincial review in 2012, the results of which
were announced in a new Act in June 2015. Developer and consumer
consultations resulted in an emphasis on ﬁve concerns; governance by
condominium boards of directors, a more responsive and independent
dispute resolution system, greater transparency of condominium build-
ing ﬁnances, increased consumer protection when purchasing a condo-
minium, and improved training for condominium management ﬁrms
and managers (Public Policy Forum, 2013). End of life and building
salewere not ﬂagged as key concerns in the consultation documents, al-
though condominium conversions to rental units was highlighted as a
potential issue.
The changes to the Act are a direct response to the signiﬁcant growth
in the share of condominium ownership in Ontario, and particularly the
City of Toronto. Between 2010 and 2014, condominiums comprised 80%of new residential development in the city, the highest level recorded
for a 5-year period. In contrast, 20% of residential units were built as
condominiums in the lower density suburban portions of the Greater
Toronto Area (City of Toronto, 2015a). In fact, the role of condominiums
in Toronto's intensiﬁcation is apparent as 40.4% of proposed units were
located in the Downtown and Central Waterfront between 2010 and
2014, which was the highest concentration in any district in the city
(City of Toronto, 2015a) (see Map 1). This concentration results in
large portions of urban neighbourhoods being composed of condomin-
ium ownership rather than traditional single-unit ownership or
purpose-built rental apartments.
The physical characteristics of downtown condominiums have
changed in response to residential market conditions. One notable
trend is the increased heights of these structures. Between 2003 and
2007, 57% of the condominium development applications were 12 sto-
reys or less while 22% were 30 storeys or more, while 2008 to 2013
had 36% of projects at 12 storeys or less, 35% exceeded 30 storeys and
11%were higher than 50 storeys (Ostler, 2014). The city linked a contin-
ued decline in the size of individual downtown condominium units to
worries over the emergence of an increasingly homogenous single per-
son/couple demographic and lack of housing opportunities for families.
These concerns were initially politically voiced by a city councillor and
subsequently addressed through the provision of city development in-
centives and imposition of regulations resulting in approximately 33%
of proposed units built between 2008 and 2013 having 2 and 3 bed-
rooms (Yelaja, 2012). However, single person households totalled 54%
in the downtown in 2011 in comparison to 32% for the entire city and
multi-person non-family households were double the Toronto rate
(Ostler, 2014), indicating that the downtown remains the preferred lo-
cation for unattached residents. This demand, combinedwith provincial
legislation supportive of urban intensiﬁcation, has led to condominium
construction across the entire city, with particular neighbourhoods in
the downtown core being largely condo-ised (see Map 2). In 2011 the
tenure split for downtown condominiums was 60% owner-occupied
and 40% rented which differed from overall downtown housing that is
65% rented and 35% owner-occupied (Ostler, 2014).
Population growth in downtown Toronto is a function of the condo-
minium market and demonstrates the prominence of the core in the
city's ongoing development. Between 2006 and 2011 the downtown
population increased by 18.0% versus the city's 4.5% rate. Stated another
way, there was a 111,779 population increase in the City of Toronto be-
tween 2006 and 2011, with 30,373 moving into the downtown. Thus
27.1% of the city's population growth took place in downtown condo-
minium neighbourhoods (Ostler, 2014).
5. Anticommons problems and their long-term effects on condo-
minium neighbourhoods
The recent concentration of condominium construction in Toronto
has resulted in condominium neighbourhoods emerging throughout
the downtown core. To understand the potential long-term implica-
tions of downtown Toronto condominium construction, the lifecycle
of condominiums must be examined individually as buildings and col-
lectively as a neighbourhood within the context of the anticommons
problem. In discussing multi-owned developments, such as condomin-
iums, Johnston and Reid (2013) have developed a lifecycle model com-
prised of three broad stages; the beginning phase includes the planning,
promotion and sales, construction, and transition from developer own-
ership to individual ownership, while the middle of life phase is con-
cerned with occupation, followed by end of life when the structure
and common facilities decay beyond reasonable use resulting in either
demolition or substantial rejuvenation.
The lifecyclemodel also incorporates the actors involved, namely the
government (predominantly in the form of local planning), ﬁnanciers
and developers (including construction, marketing, etc.), and owners
(including residential occupants and investors). The anticommons
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building progresses towards demolition or renewal, as the decisions
made (or not made) by the range of actors involved as far back as the
beginning phase progressively compounds the complexity of the prob-
lem. This is further complicated at the condominium neighbourhood
scale where the concentration of this form of ownership can potentially
amplify the anticommons problem, resulting in a range of externalities.
Based on interviews in Toronto with the key actors identiﬁed, the long-
term impact of decisions can be broadly classiﬁed into lock-in, lacunae,
and neighbourhood effects.
5.1. Lock-in effects
The planning, design, and construction of high-rise condominiums
and their surroundings have long-term impacts on the future quality,
adaptability, and marketability of condominium neighbourhoods.
These lock-in effects are often set at the beginning of the lifecycle, how-
ever the impacts are typically not noticeable until decades later. In-
terviewees expressed particular concern about the focus on current
demand for studio and one-bedroom units, the overall quality of
construction, and what this might mean in the future. One ﬁnancial
expert noted this in the context of future demand and resale value:
“There are too many small units. I do wonder about the long term.
Demand is currently strong, but what is the longer-term demand
for these types of units. I worry about the quality of them.”
(Interviewee, Financial Expert A)
Some developers interviewed attempted to address the issue of
adaptability by constructing buildings with knock out walls between
properties to allow the creation of larger units. Much of this has been
the result of policy debates around the need to encourage more
families to move and live in Toronto's downtown and diversify
the demographics of the evolving condominium neighbourhoods.
“Let's say you have a two bedroom next to a studio. If they want to
make it a three bedroom they could use a knock out panel and all
that, so we are looking at that.” (Interviewee, Developer B)
Yet in practice, such an approach is problematic:
“If knock out panels are in place you can do it for the ﬁrst purchase
but then it is very tricky to ﬁnd two units that are next to each other
[for sale] in order to create that. We will allow some knock out
panels but for the most part we want to see a minimum percentage
of two or three bedrooms and that helps. Although some of the three
bedrooms that we are seeing right now are smaller than the studio
condo that I ﬁrst purchased when I ﬁrst made my own investment.”
(Interviewee, Planner D)
Some interviewees argued that Toronto has large numbers of older
residential high-rise buildings that are in good condition, so there is
no reason to be concerned about possible building deterioration. Yet
many of those are purpose-built rental buildings with a single commer-
cial owner maintaining their investment over the long-term. Even with
a single ownermany of those older residential high-rise buildings are in
fact deteriorating as indicated by the City of Toronto's Tower
Neighbourhood Renewal Progamme, which aims to revitalize inner
suburban post-war rental apartment buildings (Poppe & Young,
2015). This is in contrast to multi-owned condominium developments
where retroﬁt and investment decisions are divided amongst a wide
range of owners with varying agendas rather than a single owner, fur-
ther complicating potential revitalization efforts. One interviewee
noted:
“The rental buildings were built far different than the condos be-
cause they are use to a ﬂow through of tenants and so they use all
these really durable materials from countertops to tiles. We hear abit that these condos are being built cheaply, the glass will only last
20 years and the elevators aren't the best, but this is just anecdotal.”
(Interviewee, Planner C)
Condominiums built in Toronto during the initial 1980s boom are
still in relatively good condition, having not surpassed the standard
50-year life span, largely because these early structures relied on differ-
ent construction techniques compared to modern developments. Older
condominiums were geared towards wealthier empty-nesters and
utilised high-end masonry, were built with poured concrete walls
throughout due to units being stack designed identically one above
the other, and included steel frames to support windows. In contrast
modern condominiums in Toronto are often targeted towards ﬁrst-
time homebuyers, this consequently leads to less expensive materials
being used and a focus on maximization of space. This results in differ-
ing unit layouts on each ﬂoor leading to fewer poured concrete sections
between units, and an increasing reliance on outer window-wall
systems (Sanati, 2016).
Several interviewees expressed concerns with the use of window-
wall systems in current condominiums. Window-wall systems are
faster and less costly to install than steel frame, curtain walls, or many
other window systems because they are inserted between the concrete
slabs of a unit and sealed using caulking and taping to stop moisture
forming in the structure (Persaud & Ramadhin, 2011). Installation
involves a large numbers of joints, increasing the chance of failure,
while the caulking and tape can crack and dry out, risking water
damage and potentially the need to reseal the entire structure. As one
interviewee worried:
“I think the whole windowwall issue is going to break down… it is
all performance based on just getting the windows done. So I don't
know, it looks pretty but architects in here talk to me and they say,
you know these window walls, these kids are going to bounce into
them. If somebody hits a window wall at the bottom and cracks
the caulking all of a sudden the structural integrity goes boom … I
think there will be huge issues and I think there could be problems
in the market.” (Interviewee, Planner B)
Anecdotal interview comments made by planners highlight a slight
ambivalence about the long-term building and neighbourhood impacts
as well as the broader public and private ﬁnancial implications that
could arise. One planner remarked:
“Time will tell. Some of these things have been put together pretty
quick.” (Interviewee, Planner A)
Developers defended their condominium construction practices.
Their responses were largely framed around addressing current market
demand, competing with other developers, and adhering to planning
restrictions. Long-term consequences were not often considered, how-
ever one well-known developer did express concerns about the impact
of poor building quality on their reputation and brand. They highlighted
that within such a strong housing market, trade and labour shortages
may lead to poor build quality:
“I think that the market is very driven by the moment, so there is a
desire to build good buildings but because there is such a rush to
get these things built the bigger issue affecting it rather than strate-
gic planning in terms of how you approach construction, is getting
good trades and labour shortages.” (Interviewee, Developer D)
When discussing building quality and market demand, one
developer's view stood in contrast to a strategic planning ofﬁcial,
noting:
“We have got media reports to say builders build with a lot of glass
because they are cheap and glass is cheap, well it is not cheap and
we use a lot of glass because people like glass, they like a nice view,
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“Which you know will not last 50 years and will present incredible
energy loss issues in the future. Issues for the condominiumcorpora-
tions I suppose.” (Interviewee, Planner E).
A provincial government ofﬁcial suggested that condominiums will
need to accumulate substantial reserves to be prepared for massive
structural failures based on construction quality, however he noted
that condominium boards responsible for these decisions have a great
deal of discretion over how they manage their maintenance fees and
capital reserve funds for building repair and investment. The ofﬁcial
went on to note that there are concerns that in the long-term the gov-
ernment may have to provide ﬁnancial support if these issues are not
adequately addressed, potentially placing a signiﬁcant burden on public
ﬁnances and raising questions about government and its role in aiding
private owners for the failure of past decisions.5.2. Lacunae effects
As condominium developments move from the beginning of their
lifecycle to the middle, ownership is passed from developer to indi-
vidual unit owners. Part of this process involves establishing a man-
dated condominium board tomanage the building. Maintenance fees
based on the square footage of each unit are set to pay for the daily
costs of maintaining the public areas and establishment of the re-
serve fund. Decisions about repairs or capital investments are made
at condominium board meetings, where a deﬁned quorum of owners
must be present.
Toronto condominiums are on average more affordable than
single-family homes and often act as a form of entry-level housing
ownership or as investment units for the rental market rather than
a deliberate choice to become a member of a condominium
community (CMHC, 2016). Yet a contrast exists between strong en-
gagement by some owners in the building and apathy from others
who are not interested in the management of the building, and by
extension their investment, leading to a potential gap in condomin-
ium governance:
“Some people who live in my building should not be condominium
owners because it is all about them and not about a collective and
you know if you are in a condominium there are 100, 200 people
whatever it is, you have tomake compromises right? But oh no some
of these people are, I don't want this, I don't want this, I don't want
this, and this colour has to be in blah, blah, blah. It is a mixed bag
and it is not for everybody - there is no question.” (Interviewee,
Condominium Owner A)
“More commonly people are apathetic from a governance perspec-
tive, condo owners and buyers under-estimate the extent they need
to engage with the building.” (Interviewee, Planner F)
Apathywas acknowledged by a number of interviewees as an obsta-
cle for obtaining the required quorum for making critical decisions re-
garding maintenance fees collected for the daily operation of public
areas and the reserve fund for capital repairs and anticipated invest-
ments in the building. Additionally, it was suggested that participation
levels are inﬂuenced by the proportion of owner-occupiers in a building
compared to those that are renters. They noted that investors who lease
out their units often do not live in the building, or even the city, and
therefore rarely attend condominium board meetings. This has particu-
lar implications for certain buildings that were primarily marketed to-
wards investors at the beginning stage of the development's lifecycle,
especially in the long-term:“The other big question is what happens when these investors who
have bought ﬂoors and ﬂoors of buildings decide that Toronto is not
the market that they want to be in anymore, would they just walk
away? Will they stop participating in the condo board? If they are
offshore, how are you going to get back at them to engage?”
(Interviewee, Planner B)
This creates a form of condominium absentee owner, whose deci-
sions (or lack thereof) not only impacts their investment but also af-
fects the investment value of all the other unit owners in the
building. Lippert (2012, p. 268) presented ﬁndings that reinforced
the argument that owner-occupiers have different priorities than in-
vestors who “seek to avoid increasing fees not only because they can-
not access the services they allow, but also because the higher rents
required to recover higher fees are thought to discourage renters
from leasing before the investor is ready to sell for proﬁt”. Further-
more, owner-occupiers who are not involved in the governance of
the building may complicate decision-making by making quorum
more difﬁcult while those that do attend meetings are often viewed
as obstructionist (Lippert & Steckle, 2016). Interviewees suggest that
these two groups are also most likely to be more concerned with
keeping maintenance fees low in the short-term rather than with
other building aspects such as capital investments and repairs that
directly impact unit values:
“We have done a reserve study for the next 10 years, we have to
spend one million dollars every year on stuff that wears out and a
lot of people I ﬁnd, because I am on the board, on previous boards
did not invest and they kept their fees at 0% or 1% and everybody
was happy with that but then stuff goes wrong.” (Interviewee, Con-
dominium Owner A)
Recently constructed buildings initially tend to collect lowermainte-
nance fees because of the lack of need for repairs and as a marketing
mechanism for developers. However as buildings age these fees often
rise out of necessity to address increasing maintenance costs. Early re-
sistance to funding preventative maintenance often leads to an exces-
sive increase in fees when a major repair is necessary, creating a
signiﬁcant burden for owners:
“Maintenance fees are the mortgage you never pay off. Where you
do get into challenges is when the maintenance fees are increasing
at a rate that far exceeds the rate of inﬂation. Like the one year that
we had a 10% increase in our maintenance fees … a $900 a month
maintenance fee all of a sudden became $1,000 a month, I said wait
a second this is not sustainable, so it was a concern for me and we
sold.” (Interviewee, Condominium Owner C)
“They do go up and in fact I know someone who bought into Radio
City [condominium building] when it opened and now he is getting
out because of the condo fees. It has been there 10 years but the con-
do fees just recently have gone through the roof.” (Interviewee, Con-
dominium Owner D)
A number of interviewees expressed a general concern that those
making decisions on condominium boards have no prior building man-
agement experience. This gap in knowledge potentially leads to mis-
management of the building and its assets, which has long-term
implications for maintenance and associated fees. Others highlighted
how condominiumboards often hire propertymanagement companies,
which themselves may not be professionally licensed:
“Sometimeswhat will happen there is that theywill go cheap on the
maintenance, the management company probably doesn't do the
maintenance or doesn't know what they are doing, or the board
doesn't knowwhat they are doing. So there is a whole sort of educa-
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now.” (Interviewee, Developer A)
New provincial legislation acknowledges this knowledge gap in the
Protecting Condominium Owners Act by enacting a range of measures in-
cluding establishing a ‘condo ofﬁce’ to “oversee education, dispute reso-
lution, condomanager licensing and tomaintain a registry of all condos
in the province” (Province of Ontario, 2016). The provincial government
recognizes that condominium board decisions may result in reserve
funds not being adequate to deal with future repairs while sudden in-
creases in maintenance fees may be unaffordable for some unit owners.
While such changes attempt to address problems with reserve funds
there continue to be concerns about the available funds and the ability
of condominium boards to manage long-term maintenance costs as a
result of circumstances beyond their control:
“In 20 or 30 years it won't be, an elevator goes down, and then 10
years later the balconies need replacing, and then 10 years later
you know something else structural comes along, it will happen all
at once right? It is almost Murphy's Law. Are they set up to weather
those kinds of shocks, and they are going to come, I think my fear is
that the answer is no.” (Interviewee, Developer C)
Therefore condominium unit owners need to proactively identify
the long-term impacts of their decisions to protect their investments.
Apathy of owners and investors in terms of governance and manage-
ment, along with a desire to defer maintenance and investment in fa-
vour of lower costs at the earlier stages of a condominium's lifecycle
regardless of longer-term repercussions is identiﬁed as a key risk.With-
in the context of a condominium neighbourhood there are serious risks
posed by the potential un-funded liabilities as buildings collectively
reach maturity.
5.3. Neighbourhood effects
The emergence of condominium neighbourhoods in downtown To-
ronto within the last ten years has resulted in a range of impacts that
stem from agglomeration effects. The planning of many of these
neighbourhoods at the beginning of the lifecycle has often occurred
based on poor condominium market assumptions. While developers
and investors focused on individual buildings, planners interviewed
discussed the need to reﬂect on the supposed self-contained nature of
condominiums and how shifts in condominium design along with the
attraction of particular demographics are impacting on the provision
of neighbourhood amenities in Toronto:
“I think Liberty Village [condominium neighbourhood] is a disaster,
there is literally no park there for a demographic that probably is
the hungriest for park land out of all the demographics. I mean look
at who is living there. There is a little postage stamp piece of grass
that is the only place for all the poodles, it is a travesty”
(Interviewee, Developer C)
Interviewees suggested that the rise of condominiums as investment
units has resulted in increases in rental rather than owner-occupied
tenure. This, along with the speciﬁc demographics that condominium
neighbourhoods are attracting, requires a different understanding of
how amenities are used and provided for, such as green space, sports
facilities, and recreation spaces:
“The thinking originally of the condominium form is that those ame-
nities are internalised in the complex, but I believe if you talk to
some of the city planners is that over time that has not been asmuch
the case - that has tended to shrink” (Interviewee, Planner E)
“Our buyers aren't looking for the types of amenities that are expen-
sive to maintain … they are not looking for the experience like themega pool and gyms they are buying access and a main street and
a more boutique living.” (Interviewee, Developer D)
Planners at the City of Toronto have also attempted to direct condo-
minium development towards predetermined sites. It was noted that
these efforts often underestimated the appeal of existing
neighbourhoods along with the ‘access’ and ‘boutique living’ noted in
the earlier quote, assuming that development on brownﬁeld sites or
main streets further from the urban core would be more prevalent:
“Well the market seems to ﬁnd interesting sites to redevelop… the
intensiﬁcation within the city has not been on the sites that we
thought. Increasingly there has been, oh another application on that
site, oh I hadn't thought of that site, you know coming for a 40-storey
tower. Then other areas where, you know back in 2000 we thought
that the Port Lands [industrial harbour area]would be starting to de-
velop now as a community and there is nothing happening there,
some of the avenues that we designated [for intensiﬁcation] there
is nothing happening.” (Interviewee, Planner E)
Instead, condominium neighbourhood development has increasing-
ly focused on sites in the urban core that provide easy access to a range
of shops, restaurants, services, and amenities. Due to the prevalence of
small lots on the main streets of Toronto, issues of fragmented owner-
ship have arisen as the larger sites are developed. This creates a chal-
lenge for land assembly as property owners can block, or increase the
cost of, condominium development:
“Certainly all the choice, easy, low hanging fruit particularly in the
most desirable areas like Liberty Village or the Distillery District or
some of the key intersections are probably long gone. So assembling
parcels thatwould get you a big enough footprint to build something
is probably more difﬁcult.” (Interviewee, Planner C)
“I think you are nowgetting down to the sort of, I don'twant to call it
scraps because it is just harder to put together, but deﬁnitely there
are more complicated assemblies involving multiple people, multi-
ple interests and there is a lot of creativity that has to happen.”
(Interviewee, Developer D).
While land assembly of small sites can increase the overall costs, this
also suggests there will be fewer development opportunities inmany of
these in-demand neighbourhoods. At the moment the sites are
assembled by a single owner, however redevelopment of these
neighbourhoods will likely require engagement with condominium
owners thereby adding further complications to land assembly. There
is a danger therefore that many of these neighbourhoods may not be
able to adapt to future conditions as land assembly becomesmore difﬁ-
cult. Long-term urban revitalisation is therefore at risk as these
neighbourhood effects place a greater burden on the very locations
that have made condominium developments so successful in Toronto.6. The implications of condominium neighbourhoods for long-term
urban revitalisation
Rosen andWalks (2013) argue that the condominium development
transformingneighbourhoods in cities such as Toronto is often predicat-
ed on a number of factors; urban intensiﬁcation policies that have suc-
cessfully proliferated as a result of demographic change, ﬁnancial
policies designed to encourage home ownership, and housing
affordability. For many cities, these relatively new condominium
neighbourhoods have uncertain long-term prospects because of a con-
text shaped by the prevalent shared ownership structure. If not appro-
priately addressed, the lock-in, lacunae, and neighbourhood effects
will potentially grow more complex over time because of the decisions
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anticommons problem due to agglomeration (Fig. 1).
6.1. Developers
The short-term market driven decisions made by developers and
their ﬁnancial backers have signiﬁcant long-term lock-in effects. The
typical focus on smaller units may address demographic and investor
demand, however the ﬁxed nature of these structures means there is
a lack of ﬂexibility to adapt to future market changes. This may lead to
decline in demand and increased emphasis on a wider range of cus-
tomers, such as investors rather than owner-occupiers in these
neighbourhoods. This potentially complicates the anticommons prob-
lem as owners with more varied interests become involved in
decision-making and capable of exercising rights of exclusion (West &
Morris, 2003). In the rush to compete with other developers in the
neighbourhood, build quality has been identiﬁed as a concern that can
potentially lead to long-term structural issues and damage to area rep-
utation. Easthope and Randolph (2016) have further highlighted the
long-term impact of initial maintenance fee levies by developers. The
marketing of condominiums to investors can also result in lacunae
effects as the research highlights this leads to a preference for
keeping maintenance fees low thereby complicating collective and co-
ordinated decision-making necessary to resolve anticommons prob-
lems (Heller, 2013). The most prescient long-term condominium
neighbourhood revitalisation issue for developers is however the in-
creased number of property owners who may utilise strategic holdout
behaviour when future action is necessary thereby increasing land as-
sembly costs for future re-development within the neighbourhood
(Schulz et al., 2002).
6.2. Owners
As condominium buildings deteriorate due to age or poor mainte-
nance, the ownership structure should require unit owners to pay in-
creased costs towards the upkeep of the common areas. Self-interest
sometimes motivates owners to limit the burden of maintenance fees,
however increases are expected to become necessary in response to
the need to address critical capital repairs. The rate of these increases
in many ways is a function of the quality of materials and labour used
when the condominiumwas constructed, which the interviewees indi-
cated is questionable. Eventually, neglect may result in a weak resale
market as the individual upkeep costs becomes greater than the value
placed on the private unit. Meanwhile costs continue to increase; main-
tenance suffers, with an increasing number of owners, and particularly
investors, potentially abandoning their properties. As a result the re-
maining owners are left to deal with higher building repair costs. In re-
sponse, the eventual redevelopment of the property could be difﬁcult.
For example, Ontario legislation gives a minority of owners (20%) the
power to veto a sale. This can create tension between majority and
minority property rights and epitomises the anticommons problem
(Sim et al., 2002; Christudason, 2009; Troy et al., 2016). At the
neighbourhood scale, condominiums built during a similar time period
risk collectively suffering deterioration leading to urban decline
(Warnken et al., 2003). If a stalemate occurs, such as that mentioned
in the opening quote to this article, theremay be a need for government
intervention to resolve the problem and halt decline.
6.3. Government
Government sets the rules of the game throughout the life of condo-
miniums. However, reactive planning decisions have tended to domi-
nate and focus on single developments while only nominally
acknowledging wider neighbourhood issues (Lippert & Steckle, 2016).
As the past decade in Toronto suggests, the pressure to process a large
number of condominiumapplications results in a lack of comprehensiveunderstanding of the collective neighbourhood impacts of the develop-
ments in the long-term (Warnken et al., 2003). At the local scale there is
a need to reconsider condominium ownership assumptions, particular-
ly in relation to the rise of investment/rental units and the expected di-
versity of unit sizes and types that are in demand. These trends could
lead to a range of externalities, including the future shift away from
the internalization of amenities in condominiums to reduce
maintenance fees. Thus, legislative rules are necessary to ensure build
quality and reserve funds are appropriate to reduce long-term capital
costs and avoid artiﬁcially low maintenance fees. As buildings
and neighbourhoods age it is also necessary for government to
enact legislation to manage a collective sale or termination of the
condominium structure to avoid the use of exclusionary rights to
delay revitalization while also addressing the need to protect minority
property rights.
7. Conclusions
The ownership structure of condominiums has the potential to be
mired in an anticommons problem. In Toronto there is a poor awareness
of this as a long-term issue by government, developers, lenders, and unit
owners. This research has sought to engage a diverse range of
stakeholders to understand the implications for condominium
neighbourhoods and their potential for future urban revitalisation. In-
terviewees suggest a range of potential areas of concern in which
anticommons problems may arise in Toronto, including the inadequate
management of reserve funds for long-term building maintenance, the
inadaptable nature of the structures themselves to respond to future de-
mographic or cultural changes, and absentee investors potentially
frustrating communal decision-making.
Of far greater importance is the long-term risk that strata owner-
ship structure poses for redevelopment of urban condominium
neighbourhoods built in the same time period and using similar con-
struction methods. Many municipal and real estate stakeholders in
Toronto seem unaware of the potential long-term consequences
that present actions could have on future urban redevelopment. As
condominium neighbourhoods develop and age, the tragedy of the
anticommons becomes more complex due in part to the lock-in, la-
cunae, and neighbourhood effects noted in this research. This study
begins to explore the dynamics of multi-owned developments at
the neighbourhood scale. Other effects not identiﬁed through this re-
search may also complicate long-term urban revitalisation of
condominium neighbourhoods and need further study, such as the
role of the developer in the management and sustained ownership
of aspects of the buildings (Easthope & Randolph, 2016).
To date the jurisdictions responding to emerging condominium
neighbourhood challenges have primarily adopted a reactive policy
stance. Toronto, for example, has only recently initiated a process to ad-
dress some of the deﬁciencies in condominium neighbourhoods
through its TOCore study (City of Toronto, 2015b). This initiative is
attempting to retroactively identify shortcomings resulting from a
shortsighted planning process by providing amenities in these growing
condominium neighbourhoods and develop strategies to make the
urban core of the city more liveable.
A more proactive approach to addressing potential lock-in, lacunae
and neighbourhood effects is necessary to ensure the long-term pros-
perity of condominium neighbourhoods. However, limited stakeholder
recognition of these issues suggests that it is necessary to raise a greater
awareness of the potential anticommons impediments to long-term
collective revitalisation actions.
The results of this research suggest that rising land values, build
quality, and demographic shifts could potentially place pressure on
urban areas to strategically address condominium neighbourhood
revitalisation. The Toronto case indicates that current legislation, de-
veloper practices, and condominium unit owner behaviour are ex-
pected to have long-term consequences for revitalising aging
57B. Webb, S. Webber / Cities 61 (2017) 48–57neighbourhoods. In particular, the diversity of ownership interests
suggest the emergence of future difﬁculties comparable to the
fragmented decision making documented in Australia and South
Korea that compromises the ability to undertake the collective action
necessary to respond to rapid building and neighbourhood deterio-
ration. Most notably future efforts could be complicated by the
type of land assembly problems that interviewees indicate are
beginning to emerge in Toronto as the city's condominium
neighbourhoods grow and intensify. Addressing these emerging
issues should be a high priority policy and research endeavour in
order to manage the long-term accumulated neighbourhood
revitalisation consequences that may result from the proliferation
of the condominium as a form of tenure.References
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